


# **Business Participation in the Responsibility to Protect**

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## **Abstract**

Past research on business engagement with human rights, peace, and security has identified specific economic and practical reasons why national and transnational companies may be interested in participating positively in these issues, as well as specific ways in which companies previously contributed to protecting human rights (e.g. Nelson, 2000). The international discussion around the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) can be considered a special case of protection of human rights and security. The issues addressed under RtoP, such as the prevention of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, are all issues that fall within the scope of business engagement with human rights or peace. This suggests that there is a role for business to contribute to the RtoP. This paper extends the existing literature in business engagement to argue that there is a specific role for businesses to participate in all three “pillars” of the RtoP. I discuss specific characteristics of RtoP that may mean that business participation in RtoP issues is more pressing or more likely than participation in other forms of human rights protection, including the severity of abuses relevant to RtoP and the current endorsement of international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

A growing literature within the broader framework of “corporate social responsibility,” has begun to develop the logic and empirical evidence of active participation by business firms in issues of armed conflict, stability, and the prevention of mass atrocities (Forrer, T. Fort, and Gilpin 2012; T. L. Fort and Schipani 2002; Nelson 2000; Oetzel et al. 2009). While this literature varies in its specific focus and recommendations, it is consistent in treating businesses as a feature in the domains where conflict is likely to occur in the 21st century and hence a potential contributor either to the resolution of these problems or their persistence. By considering firms as potentially positive actors in the sphere of human rights and security provision, albeit actors with specific incentives and reasons for choosing to engage in these issues, this literature opens several strategic possibilities by broadening the sphere of potential partners and potential tools that groups interested in supporting the prevention of armed conflict and mass atrocities can use. One specific domain where this broadened scope may be particularly valuable is in the discussion occurring around the “Responsibility to Protect” (RtoP).

RtoP as a developing international norm focuses on only a restricted list of actions widely agreed to be abhorrent: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Ki-moon 2010; UN General Assembly 2005). It has been developed as a formally constituted idea accepted by the UN General Assembly (UN General Assembly, Session 63 2009) as well as adopted in academic discussion (e.g. Evans and Sahnoun 2002; Weiss 2011; P. D. Williams and Bellamy 2012). It has also been put into practice as the basis for attempts to stop violations including economic sanctions (Cotler and Genser 2011) and military interventions (Serrano 2011). However, specific mechanisms to implement the core “pillars” of RtoP remain somewhat limited. Core documents on RtoP including the ICISS report (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001) and the 2009 Report of the UN Secretary-General (Ki-moon 2009) acknowledge the role of international NGOs as watchdogs and partners in some interventions, but other than this the primary actors in the typical discussion of RtoP are states. The “responsibilities” inherent in the framing of the issue are specifically state

responsibilities: to protect citizens, to assist other states in this protection, and to intervene when protection fails.

The literature on business participation in peace and conflict suggests that this focus on state responsibility misses a potentially significant partner. While businesses do not have the coercive power that states do, existing literature suggests that they can play a potentially powerful role in the development of RtoP violations. Businesses can contribute to stabilization through economic development. They can act as agents of norm diffusion reasserting international norms about the protection of civilians and what kinds of political action are appropriate. They can also act directly as political actors by pressuring states to avoid the kind of economic and social disruption associated with violations of RtoP, by acting as conveners to facilitate peacemaking, or supporting groups which oppose these violations. However, businesses are ultimately businesses, and they are not organized to be agents of the prevention of RtoP violations. Many companies do not see such participation as being a part of their role, and even when companies see immediate and material reasons for participating in the prevention or cessation of RtoP violations they may not see a legitimate pathway by which they may participate. For these reasons, it's important for the academic and policy discourse around RtoP to develop the role of the private sector in the prevention and cessation of RtoP violations, so that businesses can be approached with appropriate arguments and a legitimate pathway to participation may be identified.

This paper attempts to contribute to the existing discussion by pointing out the reasons that businesses may be interested in participating in RtoP issues, the methods by which firms can positively participate, the reasons why they may not have a strong record for participating to this point, and what international institutions and groups interested in the Responsibility to Protect may do to encourage business participation in this issue. I begin with a brief ideational history of RtoP.

## **A brief history of the Responsibility to Protect**

The core argument of the Responsibility to Protect is that state sovereignty does not extend to all activities: governments' primary responsibility is to protect their civilian population, and states which willingly allow the commission of mass atrocities against their citizens therefore are not legitimate. The formal beginning of the current discussion around the Responsibility to Protect can be traced to the publication of the 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, a commission lead by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun and supported by the Canadian government for the purpose of engaging with the question of how the international community should respond to mass atrocities (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). The idea did not originate purely in the discussions of the ICISS, and it has roots in prior publications focusing on the protection of refugees and humanitarian intervention such as the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" (Deng 1996). However, it was the 2001 report that introduced the term "responsibility to protect" and first fully developed the concept of RtoP. This concept was rapidly taken up in international discussion (Weiss 2011), and has been the focus of a series of reports by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon engaging with questions of how to implement RtoP (Ki-moon 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) as well as included in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit (UN General Assembly 2005) and formally adopted for consideration by the UN General Assembly in resolution A/RES/63/308 (UN General Assembly, Session 63 2009).

In its current formulation as defined by Ki-moon and generally accepted in current discourse, the responsibility to protect is focused specifically on a narrow range of mass atrocities, including "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (Ki-moon 2009; UN General Assembly 2005) and built around three broad "pillars." These pillars include: 1. "The protection responsibilities of the state," or the idea that states are required to prevent mass atrocities within their areas of control; 2. "International assistance and capacity-building," or the idea that the international community – specifically defined as UN member states in the UN documents – is

obligated to support states in their execution of the first pillar; and 3. “Timely and decisive response,” or the idea that when violations of RtoP occur, the international community is obligated to step in to stop the violations.

While most discussion of the RtoP revolves around this standard language, Stahn (2007) documents the diversity of emphasis and specific interpretations of what exactly the Responsibility to Protect entails. One of the core questions academics and policy figures have not yet come to a consensus on is to what degree states face a specific obligation to respond to significant and persistent abuses of human rights in other states, and what tools are appropriate for use in this response. Stahn points out the resistance by several states to the idea that military engagement to stop or prevent abuses is a responsibility of the international community, an extension of an ongoing discussion pre-RtoP over whether humanitarian interventions that violate sovereignty are legitimate, appropriate, or even actually motivated by humanitarian aims versus more narrow national foreign policy agendas (e.g. Ayoob 2002). This debate has continued after the introduction of RtoP as a concept, and the argument over the appropriateness of humanitarian military intervention and its associated violations of state sovereignty continues to be a feature of debate about appropriate response to ongoing violations, such as those occurring in Syria at the time of this writing (Macfarquhar and Shadid 2012). A related debate about the degree to which RtoP as a norm endorses or prescribes military intervention is likewise ongoing (Evans 2012; Thakur 2011), but the issue of humanitarian intervention and particularly humanitarian military intervention remains a major part of the implementation of RtoP as it has developed. RtoP was held up as the basis for the use of military force in Côte d’Ivoire (Serrano 2011), and in 2011 it became the basis for Resolution 1973, which approved the use of military force in Libya. This resolution was the first resolution by the UN Security Council that authorized the use of force within a state against the wishes of the government of that state (Bellamy and P. D. Williams 2011; P. D. Williams and Bellamy 2012).

The discussion around RtoP has demonstrated much more consensus about the use of means other than military force by the UN to protect people from atrocity (Stahn 2007). In part as a way of addressing the concerns of states resistant to endorsing military force, much of the discussion around RtoP after the ICISS report emphasized early warning and prevention of potential abuses: the first two “pillars” of RtoP (Weiss 2011). Ki-moon’s (2009) initial report on implementing RtoP issues identified several recommendations for nonmilitary response to the prevention or cessation of violations of RtoP. These recommendations emphasized research on predictors and early-warning signs for mass atrocities as well as encouraging and developing representative and open state systems, a strengthened International Criminal Court and international legal system, and training and capacity building for state institutions. Consistent with the state-focused discussion at the UN, this report emphasized that prevention was “first and foremost ... a matter of State responsibility” (Ki-moon 2009, 10). Despite this, in identifying specific recommendations including capacity building and training and education programs he identified valuable contributions made by specific non-state actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Fund for Peace. Once indicators of violation were increasing, Ki-moon recommended that international diplomacy focus on sending clear messages encouraging states to take positive actions, develop state capacity to provide and enforce the rule of law, and develop “specific capacities within societies that would make them less likely to travel the path to crimes relating to the responsibility to protect.” (Ki-moon 2009, 20). Once the third pillar of timely and decisive action is invoked, Ki-moon’s non-military recommendations included diplomatic efforts as well as economic sanctions and organized activity by civil society including NGO and business sectors.

Actual prevention and assistance efforts carried out under the banner of RtoP have incorporated this diversity of responses, and have ranged from military interventions such as those in Cote D’Ivoire and Libya (Bellamy and P. D. Williams 2011), targeted economic sanctions such as those levied against leaders in Syria and Burma, and

voluntary divestment and embargo campaigns conducted without UN coordination (Aboa and Hunt 2011; Bechky 2009).

The current state of the Responsibility to Protect is therefore that the primary discussion has occurred with reference to states, the UN and other IGOs as the primary actors and the entities to whom the primary responsibilities accrue. Despite this focus, the discussion has acknowledged both the interest and the potential that non-state actors have in impacting violations of the Responsibility to Protect, and there are specific instances in which the role of non-state actors as political entities can be identified. This suggests a pathway to addressing one of the ongoing controversies over RtoP: the degree to which coercive intervention is legitimate or appropriate. Given the consensus that non-military activities are more broadly acceptable than military interventions, a wider toolbox that incorporates a diverse array of actors could increase the flexibility and effectiveness of institutions interested in supporting the RtoP. One particularly relevant set of actors is the for-profit sector, where there is a developing consensus that violent conflict poses significant challenges to companies' economic interests, and there are significant benefits for positive engagement around the prevention or cessation of violence. The remainder of this paper will focus on this question.

### **Why business? The business case for support of RtoP**

A common understanding of business is that because of its focus on profits, and a tendency towards a short-term view of economic return, business is at best a neutral observer of violations of human rights and at worst actively rewarded for complicity in violations: Clapham and Jerbi (2001) spent twelve pages on the development of a categorization scheme for human rights abuses by corporations driven by profit. This critical perspective has been buttressed by the very real violations committed or quietly supported by companies both in the past (e.g. Lippman 1995; Schlesinger, Kinzer, and Coatsworth 2005) and more recently (e.g. Lifsher 2005). However, this understanding of business is somewhat of a caricature: it moves from the assessment that the primary motivations of businesses are profit and not the protection of human rights to concluding

that this incentive structure can only lead to problems and never more positive activity. This assumption ignores the fact that there are specific economic incentives for businesses to positively participate in the protection of people internationally. Some of these incentives come from changes in the international legal and consumer environment over the past 50 years, in ways that penalize businesses that contribute to problems and reward businesses who help resolve them. Others are due to the fundamental logic of conflict and the role that business plays in society: conflict is disruptive and costly, and promoting the quick resolution of conflict can be a profit-supporting activity for businesses. The fact that some businesses choose to engage in more harmful activities despite these incentives does not suggest that negative activities are the best economic course: in the same way that Enron's culture of emphasis on the bottom line at all costs ended up leading to one of the most spectacular bankruptcies of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century (Sims and Brinkmann 2003), businesses do not always choose the best long-term option when dealing with issues of human rights. Existing research in business engagement has attempted to map out the incentives that point towards positive engagement with these issues.

In laying out these incentives, it is necessary to first be specific in the scope of the discussion. For the purpose of this paper, I am interested in examining the role of the private sector in supporting the prevention, cessation, and recovery from the kinds of atrocities associated with RtoP. The private sector encompasses a diversity of specific actors, ranging from large transnational corporations with activities or assets across multiple states, down to small family-owned or sole-proprietor enterprises with relatively few assets and deep social and economic ties to a single specific community. It also encompasses a diversity of organizations, ranging from single businesses who are implicated in RtoP issues all the way up to national and transnational organizations composed of representatives from business society and focused directly on political engagement such as the International Chamber of Commerce (Kelly 2005). These different actors have differing incentives, capacities, and available options on how to respond to violations of RtoP principles, according to the size, organization, and focus of

each enterprise (e.g. Forrer, T. Fort, and Gilpin 2012; Nelson 2000). However, the fact that all of these actors are engaged in profit-seeking behavior means that they can be assumed to share some foundational motivations that will affect their goals in conflict and unstable situations.

The domain of RtoP, as defined by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and reaffirmed in the 2009 UN Report of the Secretary-General (Ki-moon 2010; UN General Assembly 2005), is limited to major and significant atrocities, including “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” This definition implicates two streams of research in business engagement. One is “Corporate Social Responsibility,” which looks at how businesses can positively contribute to a variety of social problems including the protection human rights. Corporate social responsibility has been an increasing area of focus, and there’s a body of empirical literature that maps out the circumstances under which businesses can be motivated to engage with social good as a matter of good business decision making (see Aguinis and Glavas (2012) for a review). The second literature is the specific question of how businesses can contribute to peace and the prevention or cessation of armed conflict – called “Corporate Security Responsibility” by Wolf and colleagues (Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007). This business and peace literature is distinct from the larger literature on corporate support for human rights because it focuses not on human rights in general but specifically on large-scale instability and armed conflict. This focus requires a different set of responses from relevant businesses, and invokes different concerns than a broader focus on human rights. While this area of research is more recent as a focus than corporate social responsibility broadly defined, it is a developing area and one which is attracting increasing interest and research support (see Forrer, Fort, & Gilpin (2012) for an introduction). Both streams are also directly relevant to the question of business engagement in RtoP. The next sections of this paper will review what these literatures suggest about business incentives for participating, capacities for assisting with RtoP, and barriers to participation.

## Incentives for business participation

Businesses face incentives to participate in the prevention or cessation of RtoP violations, based on economic, legal, and moral grounds (Seyle and Aloyo 2012). The dominant reason is simply stability: abuse rising to the level of a violation of the Responsibility to Protect indicates a major fissure in society. The mass atrocities identified as violations of the RtoP are in many cases associated with open and ongoing violent conflict between armed actors, as in Syria, Lebanon, and Côte d'Ivoire. Even when they are not associated with open armed conflict they are associated with widespread violence or systematized persecution, as in Kenya or Burma. This is ultimately bad for business: with the exception of companies that provide military goods or otherwise directly profit from conflict, armed conflict is enormously destructive to the profit-generating activities of companies operating in the region. Armed conflict destroys critical infrastructure, disrupting supply chains and damaging capital investments (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003). Political instability drives away tourism (Richter 1992; Sönmez 1998) and foreign investment (Busse and Hefeker 2007) and impacts GDP (Sevastianova 2009). RtoP violations specifically, rather than conflict in general, are additionally characterized by a direct focus on the murder or displacement of civilian groups or direct attacks on civilian infrastructure. This focus is likely to magnify the disruptive influence of conflict on businesses: rather than targeting military installations or activities, violations of RtoP directly target civilians and civilian enterprises, including businesses. One example of this is found in the post-election violence in Kenya: as a part of widespread ethnic conflict, members of the Kalenjin community specifically targeted workers at tea farms belonging to the Unilever company because of hiring practices they felt privileged members of other ethnic groups. Unilever Tea Kenya, a subsidiary company, estimated damage due to these attacks at 30 million Kenya shillings – around \$450,000 (Hull 2008). A second example is found in the attacks by the Libyan military on oil fields and industry that occurred as a part of the Libyan rebellion, attacks which significantly disrupted oil exports (Schemm and Michael 2011). Because of these impacts, businesses have a collective economic interest in stability and many businesses have

specific and individual material interests in preventing attacks or instability that will disproportionately affect their workers or capital investments.

In addition to this systemic interest in stability, the public understanding and perspective on corporate social responsibility has shifted significantly since the days of the United Fruit Company and public perception of involvement in conflict is now a key part of the consumer and investor perception of companies. For some companies, particularly companies relying on brand identity and selling products or services directly to end users, a corporate identity that directly ties corporate activity to the protection of human rights or the prevention of abuse can be a significant value. Despite a degree of resistance from some consumers who have a negative perspective on the idea of corporate social responsibility overall (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001), consumers have persistently demonstrated a willingness to pay more for products that support issues that they care about (Mohr, Webb, and Harris 2001), if they feel that this support is more genuine than opportunistic (Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, and Hill 2006). This is particularly true for companies which rely on reputation and consumer perceptions to drive purchasing behavior (Siegel and Vitaliano 2007). It may also be particularly important for “first movers,” or those companies which are able to establish a credible identity as a contributor to a specific issue before other companies do. In doing so, companies are able to associate themselves with the issue in the minds of consumers in a manner that may lead to a lasting association even when other companies engage in similar activities (Cramer and Karabell 2011). This general conclusion was supported by a recent review of the CSR literature, which found a “small but positive” relationship between CSR and financial outcomes, as well as several positive non-financial outcomes such as improved attractiveness to investors and improved management practices (Aguinis and Glavas 2012).

There is also a “carrot and stick” element to the public perception of corporate social responsibility, with some consumers or investors being willing to punish companies for real or perceived engagement with violations of the Responsibility to Protect. In

response to genocide in Sudan, a movement began to pass laws in US states to direct state governments to divest from companies targeted as supporting the government of Sudan through their operations and engagement in that country. This was a not-inconsiderable stick, as the states included California, whose California Public Employees' Retirement System is the US's largest public pension fund (Bechky 2009). This legal action was coupled with direct engagement with investors and shareholders to encourage divestment, a tactic which had significant impact in encouraging companies to stop doing business with Sudan (Hubbard Preston 2008). The visibility and severity of RtoP violations opens companies to this kind of organized movement if they accidentally or deliberately support states in violation of RtoP.

Overall, then, the developing research on the impacts of conflict, the impacts of CSR and the increasingly nuanced public and consumer understanding of what kinds of behavior are expected from businesses, all converge to demonstrate that businesses have a vested economic interest in the prevention and cessation of RtoP violations. Not all of these pressures will impact all companies equally: for example, consumer-focused corporations may be more susceptible to positive or negative impacts to their public perception than companies involved in the extractive industry but also may be less impacted by infrastructure disruption due to an easier time exiting from the conflict area. The diversity of pathways by which RtoP violations can impact companies' bottom lines does suggest that it's likely that almost any company operating in a conflict area and not directly profiting from the conflict will be negatively affected.

In addition to the economic interests, there may also be legal pressures that would motivate companies to respond to RtoP violations. The degree to which international law directly places a prosecutable obligation on business entities to protect human rights is a highly contested question. Weissbrodt (2005) argued that while there are no international treaties which specify legal responsibilities of business entities, several treaties including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Racial Discrimination all explicitly obligate the state to protect human rights, and hence require the state to prosecute entities which contribute to such a violation. This obligation was reiterated in the 2003 adoption of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights by the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2003). This document, although not a treaty-based source of international law, was nonetheless intended to be a non-voluntary statement about the responsibility of business to refrain from violating human rights internationally which drew from treaty-based sources of law and hence a potential source of legal claims (Weissbrodt and Kruger 2003). Essentially, the current legal standard is that if a company is manifestly engaged in the commission of activities which violate these declarations, then the state is obligated to step in to stop such violations. Similarly, if a company is actively complicit in activities which support a violation of RtoP, then the shared responsibilities acknowledged by UN member states under RtoP obligate the international community to put a stop to these activities. This complicity is not an absurd hypothesis: in addition to historical cases of companies directly participating in genocide or ethnic cleansing through the use of slave labor (Ramasastry 2002), several modern companies have been implicated in mass violence. Within the United States, the Alien Tort Claims Act has been used by foreign nationals to bring suit against companies they allege contributed to violations of human rights outside of the US (Shamir 2004), although the scope and extent of this application is currently under review (Bobelian 2012). More significantly for RtoP, the category of abuses identified as relevant to RtoP draw heavily from the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court, meaning that the ICC will often have the ability to claim jurisdiction over abuses of RtoP. The ICC has used this jurisdiction in cases relevant to business: in 2011 the International Criminal Court summoned Kenyan radio presenter Joshua Arap Sang to answer the charge of crimes against humanity on the basis of claims that he used his radio show to support violence (International Criminal Court 2011). If other companies were similarly found to be directly involved in the

support of violations of RtoP, then the decision makers within the company may face similar censure.

These arguments focus primarily on businesses' legal responsibility to avoid complicity in RtoP violations. While this is obviously of critical importance, simply not making the problem worse falls far short of actively attempting to promote the prevention or cessation of RtoP violations. While companies do not have a legal duty to engage in this proactive behavior, Williams and Conley (2005) pointed out that publicly traded corporations do have a clear legal fiduciary duty of care to their shareholders that could lead to personal liability if their failures to protect human rights lead to manifest damage to the company or a large-scale lawsuit. That is, if a supportable case can be made that companies damaged their bottom line by not assisting in the prevention of some violation of RtoP, corporate decision makers could be held personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duty of care. In order for this to be the case, plaintiffs would need to prove that both that some potential activity involved with preventing the violation would have led to financial benefit, and that the decision makers ignored this potential without good-faith consideration of whether or not to engage – a very high standard for plaintiffs to meet. However, as Williams and Conley (2005) point out “an utter failure to do anything to attempt to assure that reasonable information and reporting systems exist with respect to human rights compliance” could easily be seen as a lack of any good-faith effort whatsoever. It's possible that as the economic benefit of positive contributions to the prevention or cessation of armed conflict and violations of RtoP become more entrenched in the existing research and understood more completely, there will be a stronger case that the fiduciary duty of care for corporations requires such behavior, on threat of a lawsuit from shareholders. Moreover, such an entrenchment may not need to be fully developed in order to spur action by corporations: Shamir's (2004) analysis of corporate responses to claims under the Alien Tort Claim Act argues that in the presence of legal threats that would emphasize punishment for violations, large multinational corporations have responded with a dual-track approach of both fighting the legal regulations but also developing and emphasizing voluntary positive engagement

in human rights and issues of social responsibility. This suggests that to the degree that legal systems even begin to emphasize a move towards positive engagement as a regulatory standard, businesses will proactively develop more plans in this area.

Finally, in addition to the economic and the legal pressures encouraging pro-RtoP performance, the moral element of decision making around RtoP should be acknowledged. Research in ethical decision making in business has found a somewhat complex structure underpinning the degree to which executives' decisions are influenced by their personal ethical beliefs, but acknowledges that personal morals do affect the decisions that executives make (Trevino 1986). Businesses are constrained in their decision making by their fiduciary duty of care, and also by a distributed decision making process which breaks up responsibility for decisions. The former provides both specific reasons not to engage in positive behavior that doesn't have an obvious economic benefit, and also provides a fig-leaf for people who might be otherwise troubled by not acting. The latter means that it's easier for decision makers to feel that they don't have personal responsibility for the decisions of the organization as a whole, something that is particularly relevant in explaining why individuals will not assist to stop ongoing emergencies (Darley and Latané 1968). However, the people at both transnational and local companies who are making decisions are still people, and when given the opportunity to people demonstrate a significant preference for making decisions in line with their existing moral beliefs (Vallerand et al. 1992). Decision makers in business contexts display the same preference, and while the degree to which they will work to bring their business decisions in line with their personal moral beliefs can be affected both by individual and corporate characteristics (Ford and Richardson 1994), their personal moral beliefs will affect their thinking about business decisions. Many people, including many decision makers in business, share a moral belief that opposes the kind of abuses identified as violations of the Responsibility to Protect. If business leaders can be presented with the opportunity to act in line with their moral beliefs, in a way that does not undermine their fiduciary duty to their shareholders or other responsibilities, then it

can be expected that they will actively choose to do so (a finding supported by Aguinis & Glavas' (2012) review of current research in the motivations and outcomes of CSR).

It's important to acknowledge in any review like this that these business incentives can be understood in a naïve manner, which simply emphasizes the potential good for a given company without appreciating the company context, internal pressures, and bottom-line challenges or that company faces. Understood in this fashion, these arguments are likely to be unconvincing to decision makers at firms who are not already embedded in the world of corporate social responsibility. The abstract benefits that accrue from stability are not necessarily a compelling argument when compared to immediate short-term costs. A more compelling argument must be built on the details of a given firm. Specific businesses assessing their potential role in RtoP issues should focus on the question of what specific social issues are directly implicated in their business activities, due either to the expectations of their consumer base or as a specific risk to their value chain (Porter and Kramer 2006), and the risk and potential profit attached to each specific activity they are considering. This approach calls for companies, and NGO or other actors interested in motivating firms to participate in social issues, to make a targeted and direct assessment of the potential economic and legal risks of human rights violations as they apply to the specific and concrete activities of a given firm. A developing RtoP issue such as the outbreak of ethnic tensions trending toward open conflict may be of only academic concern to a company operating with a limited footprint in the target country. Alternately, it may be seen by a TNC with such a footprint as an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the prevention of atrocities as a way of establishing its social responsibility *bona fides*. In contrast, to a company that sources raw materials from the unstable country, or which has extensive capital investments which cannot easily be withdrawn, the risk of disruption is more direct and the potential cost is much higher. Porter and Kramer (2006) draw a distinction between the first case of corporations acting in order to signal concern about issues, which they identify as "Responsive Corporate Social Responsibility," and the second case of corporations acting to protect potential disruptions to specific activities, which they identify as "Strategic

Corporate Social Responsibility.” The economic incentives for the first rely on the effective communication of their activities to consumers or investors and the perception that they have contributed to the problem. In contrast, the economic incentives for the second are much more embedded in the effective resolution of the problem and have less to do with the public awareness of any specific activities. The pathways to approaching each individual business and encouraging their engagement will differ dramatically depending on how the company sees the intended economic implications of conflict. However, broadly speaking the research in both corporate social responsibility and business and peace suggests that there are a wide variety of reasons why companies may be interested in participating in RtoP issues.

### What can businesses do? The preventive pillars

The first two “pillars” of the Responsibility to Protect emphasize the prevention of mass atrocities, but differ in their focus. The first pillar emphasizes the responsibility of states to protect those within the state from atrocity, while the second pillar emphasizes the responsibility of other states to provide assistance to allow the host country to execute this protection. Business has a direct role to play in supporting this prevention, through both facilitating early warning and directly supporting the capacity of a state to prevent atrocities.

One simple but often overlooked point is that business operations, by their nature as an economic and profit-generating enterprise, can contribute to the maintenance of peace simply by encouraging economic activity (Forrer, T. Fort, and Gilpin 2012) if business is conducted along conflict-sensitive paths. The connection between poverty and violence within a state is robust (see for example (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Collier and Bank 2003; Dixon 2009), and to the degree to which businesses provide a mechanism for the alleviation of poverty, they may address this link. It is not the case that all economic activity is created equal, though. Leaving aside the case of direct profit by complicity in RtoP violations (Clapham and Jerbi 2001), even typical business activities can be structured in ways that exacerbate the risk of intergroup violence. When business

activities lead to a system which disproportionately benefits one political, ethnic, or social group over another, there is a stronger incentive for violence – to take the benefits, in the case of the dispossessed group, and to defend them in the case of the group which is in power. Business decisions about hiring, where to place specific activities, and who to involve in decision making (and whether or not to pay these people, licitly or illicitly) can inflame existing tensions when some groups feel that they are cut out of the potential benefits of business operations. One example of this is found in the Niger Delta, where militants from the Ogoni and Ijaw tribes justify their attacks by claims that profits from the oil development in the delta have not been justly shared (Junger 2007). Work in the “resource curse” has demarcated the impact of a state’s reliance on natural resources such as oil, which are easily controlled by one central group and funneled to specific recipients, and found a significant relationship between natural resource wealth and armed conflict (Ross 2008). Mary Kaldor (1999) similarly argued that one key aspect of modern conflict or “new wars” is the degree to which they’re characterized by a nexus between social or ethnic identity and conflict-fueled group profit, a finding which has been supported by quantitative models of conflict duration (e.g. Fearon 2004). The specific mechanism by which distribution of economic activity leads to stability or conflict may be complex: if there is an inequitable distribution which privileges the dominant group, then this may reinforce the capacity of this group to enforce stability. However, in the context of RtoP this also means that the dominant group will be better resourced to engage in systematic violations of RtoP if they are provoked.

It is therefore the case that simply by virtue of their presence and operations, businesses are implicated in either encouraging stability or conflict. Business activities can be structured to contribute to either, and when considering the prevention pillar of RtoP, the structure and role of business activities within the state should not be overlooked. A healthy, transparent economic sector is a key part of stability and interacts directly with good governance principles that support peace (Cortright, Seyle, and Wall 2012). To support this, businesses can work to directly engage with local communities in a way that allows businesses to participate alongside communities in effective decision

making about their operations and the impact of their business on the community (Gansom and Wennmann 2012). The role of transparency about economic and resource flows in integration with local communities may be particularly important: one policy prescription common in work in the “resource curse” suggests that the potentially deleterious effects of state overreliance on resource exports can be reduced if industry is open and transparent about where exactly profits from their activities are directed. A recent review of this existing literature by Kolstad and Wiig (2009) found several mechanisms by which transparency could in fact be helpful in reducing corruption associated with high-resource countries, although they argue that the impact of transparency initiatives are probably not as strong as direct institution-building. However, while institution-building requires participation of local institutions, transparency can be a unilateral activity of business and therefore may be a more appropriate starting point for business activities. More broadly, best-practice recommendations for work in unstable countries depend specifically on the business and its capacities, but a number of NGOs and other groups have worked to develop principles for specific business sectors and their operations to help prevent contributing to instability. These include the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which emphasizes disclosure (Haufler 2010); the embattled Kimberley Process, which certified diamonds as not contributing to conflict (Wright 2004); and several organizations supporting the implementation of the UN’s Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, principles designed to support business activity that enhances security and stability in countries where companies operate (e.g. ICMM et al. 2012). Overall, responsible companies can structure their activities to support economic growth and peace without impacting their bottom line, but may need support from IGOs and NGOs to identify specific ways to do so.

In addition to this, companies can contribute directly to state capacity building to support the prevention of violations of RtoP. There is good evidence that transnational corporations have an impact on the governments of states in which they operate. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) identified three pathways by which TNCs affected the behavior of

host states. By acting as local agents subject to laws from other states, TNCs allow the transmission of “regulatory pressure” that constrains the behavior of employees operating in the host country. By demonstrating international standards for best operating practices, TNCs encourage host country institutions to adhere to these standards in order to get the benefits of them. Finally, by providing contact with international professionals, TNCs facilitate the professionalization of activities in the host country. These pathways have been associated with a reduction of corruption in host country institutions (Kwok and Tadesse 2006). The same pressures can act to discourage trends which support violations of the Responsibility to Protect. More directly, companies can use direct political pressure to encourage state governments to condemn or stop engaging in activities associated with developing tensions such as the systematic exclusion of social, ethnic, or religious groups from economic or government activity, or the transmission of messages targeting specific ethnic groups.

Companies may also directly intervene to stop the use of their businesses to facilitate violations. Due to the modern role of telecommunication in social organizing, companies engaged in this sector may have a specific opportunity to participate in the prevention of RtoP violations through their normal operations and decisions about what kinds of messages they will carry. One example of this is found in Kenya: following the use of text messages to organize post-election violence in 2007, the Kenyan telecommunications company Safaricom sent counter messages calling for peace, and following the violence put into place a filtering system that can prevent messages supporting violence from being sent (BBC World Service Trust 2008; Quist-Arcton 2008).

When considering prevention, then, the role of business is twofold. One is in contributing to broad societal trends which may encourage violence or stability: the enduring background pressure which can contribute to setting the stage for RtoP violations. The second is by more targeted preventive activity either through business practices and policies or, where possible, directly promoting peacebuilding activities. The

latter two points will arise again in considering how businesses can participate in the response to ongoing atrocities.

### What can businesses do? The response pillar

Despite the general preference among UN member states for focusing on the prevention pillars and avoiding the more thorny question of intervention (Weiss 2011), the question of when and how “timely and decisive responses” to stop ongoing violations can be executed remains at the core of the Responsibility to Protect. This question was the core question that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty set out to solve in the report that eventually launched the discussion about RtoP (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). Although military interventions such as those taken in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire are the most visible type of intervention, any specific activity taken to coerce states to cease the commission of actions which violate the RtoP falls under the “third pillar.” When considering past interventions imposed by international organizations, these coercive interventions have intersected directly with the role of business through the imposition of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions have been a frequent tool of the international community as a part of an escalation of pressure in cases of potential RtoP violations. During the Libyan uprising in 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1970 imposed an arms embargo on Libya and also froze the assets of key figures of the Gaddafi regime. While debate about the effectiveness of such sanctions is ongoing (see, among many others, Ang, Peksen, and others 2007; D. Cortright, Lopez, and Gerber 2002; Drezner 2003; Escriba-Folch 2010), it is certainly true that the suspension of economic activity or specific types of economic activity has been a tool used by international organizations to attempt to pressure noncompliant states into ceasing violations of RtoP.

The use of sanctions suggests that there is a role for the private sector to act as a point of pressure to encourage the cessation of ongoing violations of RtoP. Research in how businesses have engaged with armed conflict in the past suggests that this potential role is broader than the simple binary between allowing or banning engagement with

violating governments that economic sanctions tend to fall into. As with prevention, the specific role of a given business must depend on its capacity and ability. However, there are several general types of direct engagement that can be identified (Seyle and Aloyo 2012). Business interested in supporting the cessation of RtoP violations can do so by putting direct or indirect political pressure on the violating states. They can also choose to directly support internal or external forces working to stop violations, and they can also assist with negotiated settlements by acting as a convener.

In the first case, businesses can use their political influence and access to pressure violating states to stop, either directly or indirectly through facilitating other entities. The integration of business and government in many states is something that is widely acknowledged, and this integration is likely to be particularly strong in the case of weak or developing states where the risk of RtoP violations is increased. One interestingly candid example of this is found in the leaked US diplomatic cables revealed in 2010, where a Shell Vice-President admitted to the US Ambassador to Nigeria that Shell had integrations “at all levels” of the Nigerian government, and that Shell had access to “everything that was being done” at those ministries (Guardian.co.uk 2010a). In later cables, the same Vice-President is reported to have shared information about the arms and activities of Nigerian violent groups with the US Ambassador, potentially out of a desire to assist or shape US military operations against these groups (Guardian.co.uk 2010b). In addition to the facilitation of information gathering around the scope or characteristics of a problem, as this case illustrates, companies can also provide pathways for information to be passed on to governments. This can allow for more subtle diplomatic efforts than those taken openly, and companies may be taken as a more neutral information broker than an entity formally allied with an existing state. Mixing these two roles, businesses can also act as a convener or middle-man to support negotiations or other forms of communication between combatants. As a presumably neutral party, businesses may be able to act as third-party information brokers accepted by both combatant groups. An example of this is found in apartheid South Africa, where South African companies acted as middlemen and conveners to support interactions

between the government and opposition groups through their “Consultative Business Movement” (Nelson 2000).

A more active step would be for companies to act more publicly to increase pressure on states to stop violations, by publicizing the conflict and its impact. An interesting case of this, albeit one focused on conflict in general more than RtoP, is ongoing in Belfast, Northern Ireland as of the writing of this paper. After the December 3<sup>rd</sup> 2012 decision by the Belfast City Council to cease the daily display of the British flag, Loyalist groups broke out in rioting that escalated to gunfire and bomb attacks. Tourist income and economic activity immediately suffered, and several businesses and business organizations responded by beginning a media campaign which publicized the ongoing cost of the conflict and the number of jobs lost (Ingle 2013). This pressure is intended both to encourage economic activity as well as drive the state and the public to oppose the riots, but it is one example of businesses identifying a clear cost to instability and coming together to act to demonstrate that cost. Belfast has many characteristics that challenge the direct application of this case to past cases of RtoP violations: it is a stable democracy in a developed country, and as such the role of media pressure on the public may be particularly impactful. However, this case nevertheless demonstrates both the bottom-line interest business has in rejecting instability and also a creative approach to addressing the potentially impending outbreak of hostilities.

Businesses can also provide direct support to state or non-state actors working to resist violations of RtoP. While some forms of support are obvious, such as the direct provision of financial or logistical resources to IGOs, NGOs, and other groups resisting RtoP violations, RtoP also invokes other less direct pathways to support groups opposing violating states. One example of this the question of legitimacy, and specifically to what degree RtoP violations undermine the claims of state governments to be the legitimate representatives of the state and therefore responsible for the collection of taxes and distribution of state goods. In the ICISS’s conception of RtoP as a responsibility, the intentional violation of RtoP principles de-legitimizes the government which supports

such violations. As a result, rebel groups and insurgents operating against the government have more potential legitimacy as the appropriate representatives and governments of the public, by the virtue of the fact that they may not have demonstrated a willingness to engage in mass atrocities. In such a case the question of which group is the legitimate government of the state is a critical one because this invokes questions about which entity should be legally allowed to act on behalf of the people of the state, including selling national resources. This question came to the fore in Libya, when the UN Security Council froze the assets of the Libyan National Oil Company and the rebels set up a new national oil company to oversee the sale of Libyan oil (Varner 2011). Oil companies interested in buying Libyan oil faced the decision of whether to work with the new government or not, a decision made much easier by the role of the UN Security Council in condemning Gaddafi. This case also underlines the role of first-movers: Libyan rebels acknowledged that they would give preferential treatment to companies from states that supported their rebellion (Krauss 2011), and this raises the question of whether individual companies could face similar pushback if they did not quickly align with the group that ended in long-term control of the state. A similar question arose in the Côte d'Ivoire intervention, when the internationally recognized winner of the contested election, Alassane Ouattara, requested a voluntary embargo of cocoa as a way of increasing pressure on the Gbagbo government. Several major cocoa producers followed through with this (Aboa and Hunt 2011), although they faced no legal mandate to do so. One obvious interpretation of their voluntary compliance was that they recognized Ouattara as the most likely new president, and wanted to comply with his request. Whether this was for political, public appearance or potential moral reasons is not as obvious.

In addition to the broad potential for business, as with prevention there may be a particularly strong role for telecommunication companies to provide support to resistance movements, as these companies by their nature allow both tools for supporting resistance as well as developing significant intelligence about the nature of such resistance. In the case of the “Arab Spring” democratizing movement,

telecommunication played a significant role (Dewey et al. 2012) and telecommunication companies were forced to decide whether to work with states to suppress the use of their tools, or allow protestors to use their platforms to support organization. Some companies worked with states, as Vodafone is suspected of doing in Egypt – a decision which led to lasting damage to their public image in Egypt (Shenker 2011). Other companies made a conscious decision to not work with the state, as Facebook did in response to attempted, although unauthorized, access by the Tunisian government (Madrigal 2011).

All of the above activities do imply that companies are actively taking a stance against the state structures which are violating RtoP, a decision which has political implications for the company and its employees. However, as in the case of the Libyan national oil and the Ivorian cocoa, a fundamental question of RtoP is that of the legitimacy of violating governments. Third-pillar interventions, by their nature as responses to persistent violations of RtoP, imply a serious failure of the state government sufficient to challenge its legitimacy as the appropriate government of the state. While third-pillar interventions do not necessarily require regime change, and the discussion of RtoP should be careful in considering the degree to which regime change is implied by third-pillar interventions, nonetheless it is the case that when the third pillar is invoked by international observers it suggests that at minimum there is a serious question about the legitimacy of the activities of the current state leaders. This suggests that a decision by a given company to support pressure against the state by supporting other actors may be a long-term investment in access to new power brokers in the state as well as support for stability.

### **Barriers to participation**

Samuel Johnson famously responded to philosopher George Berkeley's "irrefutable" argument that only ideas could be proved to exist, not matter, by striking his foot on a stone and announcing "I refute it thus" (Boswell 1900). Researchers arguing for the positive participation of business in the protection of human rights sometimes may feel as if they risk a similar summary dismissal. If the arguments for business

participation in RtoP are sound, then why aren't companies already widely understood to be useful and publicly seen to be at the forefront of RtoP issues internationally?

One response to this question is that they often are active in these issues, but their engagement is unremarked upon either because it is seen as just one facet of a larger set of responses or because it is more subtle than the public actions of IGOs. The cases discussed above, of Facebook in Tunisia, Cargill and other companies in Côte d'Ivoire, and Shell Oil in South Africa demonstrate specific activities of business in line with the general recommendations identified in this paper. However, it is simply not convincing to claim that business is truly at the forefront of solving RtoP problems internationally but their activities are overlooked. There is too much international focus on the serious and persistent problems that characterize RtoP violations for this to be true, and that argument is additionally undercut by the recognized contribution of some unethical businesses to problems related to the violation of human rights or the extension of conflict (Ramasastry 2002). While it is certainly the case that some companies are proactive and positive in identifying and executing contributions they can make to RtoP, it is not true that this is accepted as best-practice as of yet.

Why is this? This question may be illuminated in part by research from psychology, looking at individual decision making about intervention to help resolve some ongoing problem. This research has identified several steps necessary if a person is to actively intervene. At the individual level, in order to make the decision to provide assistance in an emergency a person must notice a problem, decide that this is a problem that requires external assistance to resolve, identify that they have an individual responsibility to help, identify a specific contribution that they can make, and then execute the activity (Latané and Darley 1970). Businesses that may potentially intervene in an issue must go through a similar process in order to decide to execute an intervention, and potentially there are barriers at each step. In the first steps, the decision-makers within a business must be made aware that a problem exists and the scale of the problem is one which will require external intervention. For some non-RtoP

problems that pose challenges for business, such as ensuring compliance with company standards for treatment of workers, decision makers in business may be genuinely unaware of violations without specific auditing, as appears to be the case with recent abuses identified in the Apple supply chain (Schmitz 2013) . For the kinds of issues consistent with the responsibility to protect, however, this is less likely to be a challenge: RtoP violations are characterized by their wide impact, and it is more difficult for companies to be unaware of the problem as it develops.

A more common barrier arises in the second or third step, or the identification that external assistance is needed and attribution of a specific company responsibility to provide this help. The claims made in this paper that engagement with RtoP issues are something which will have economic, legal, and moral benefits to businesses are not accepted by all business entities. The emphasis on business is often on corporate earnings or other measures of relatively short-term returns (Rappaport 2005), which can undercut endorsing the kinds of long-term programs that many RtoP interventions require. In addition, arguments that emphasize the strategic benefit of social behavior can be treated with suspicion by some companies who may see these arguments as being biased arguments made by activists rather than genuinely profit-enhancing strategies. Without a clear basis to claim that engaging in RtoP can directly impact the profits of specific businesses, companies may dismiss calls for “corporate social responsibility,” particularly those made on moral grounds or without an emphasis on the economic benefit, with the response that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman 1970). This barrier to participation can partially be overcome by the specific activities of institutions and entities interested in supporting business engagement: groups must be able to demonstrate specific and well-supported claims that link business activities to increased profitability in the short or long term. It may also be the case that the general receptivity of business to these claims is changing over time, as the evidence for a link between corporate behavior and direct economic benefit becomes clearer. An increasing amount of empirical research is shoring up the claim that there is a direct link between positive engagement in social problems and business performance

(Aguinis and Glavas 2012; Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, and Hill 2006; Mohr, Webb, and Harris 2001; Porter and Kramer 2006; Shen and Chang 2008). Groups and initiatives such as the UN Global Compact (UNGC) are also helping to shape perceptions of standard business practice by demonstrating that many industry leaders see engagement with conflict and other social problems to be an important part of business activity. A 2007 study by Cetindamar and Husoy found that among UNGC member-business who replied to the survey, the primary beneficial impacts of participating in the UNGC included practical and measurable benefits such as networking and access to expertise as well as economic benefits associated with competitive advantages and improved corporate image (Cetindamar and Husoy 2007).

Even if a business does identify the problem as being relevant to their operations, in order to take action they must see a clear pathway for them to contribute. That is, they must identify something that they could do to contribute, and know how to put this plan into action. This can be a definite source of problems in encouraging business to participate in RtoP. One specific piece of evidence for this can be found in Jamali and Mirshak's (2009) interviews with decision makers in multinational corporations (MNCs) located in Lebanon, discussing the activities of their corporation during the conflict with Israel in 2006. These interviews found that MNC executives were acutely aware of the impact of the conflict on their business operations. However, none of the MNCs interviewed had taken any activity to directly engage with the conflict or support peace. Some of the MNCs participated in relief efforts or waived fees or collections during the conflict, and all emphasized that by continuing to pay salary and support operations in-country they supported economic activity and reduced the social impact of the conflict, but none took active steps to support peace or engage in any political activity. Quotes from interviewees suggest that this was primarily due to a belief that there was not an appropriate pathway for legitimate participation in these issues, that business was a neutral entity: in the words of one business leader "we are here, but we don't have the jurisdiction to interfere with politics or military conflict situations; we are a separate entity" (Jamali and Mirshak 2010).

This analysis uncovers two potential sources of resistance. One has to do with the decision makers' perspective of what the appropriate role of business is, as discussed above: the firm's internal perspective on legitimate action. The second is the question of legitimacy or "jurisdiction" as perceived by other actors: even if a business felt that it was appropriate to engage in activity around the conflict, if other actors perceived them to be acting illegitimately they would not be likely to have a seat at the table. It may be the case that both sources of resistance can be mediated by an active outreach attempt from other sectors involved with conflict or RtoP work. One illustration of this is found in business-NGO partnerships in the Congo, where active collaboration between corporations and NGOs assists corporations in the identification and execution of community development to help with stabilization and conflict prevention (Kolk and Lenfant 2012). Practically, it's also important to note that neither business or external actors are unitary: they are associations of individuals, with internal politics and factions that affect their decisions. Business-NGO partnerships attempting to support the perceived legitimacy of business activity in RtoP areas may need to identify specific stakeholders within the institutions involved and build political will within the organizations as well as outside the organizations.

This analysis of barriers to participation underscores an important difference between RtoP and other conflicts where business engagement has been attempted. Because of the international acknowledgement of RtoP as a norm, and the fact that RtoP violations attract attention from both IGOs and NGOs, RtoP violations are highly visible and may invoke attention from organizations and institutions that have the potential ability to credibly make outreach to businesses to participate. Business resistance to get involved with conflict issues because of a concern about the legitimacy or appropriateness of such involvement may be addressed by the endorsement of such involvement by high-level IGO approval or targeted outreach by high-impact NGOs. If business societies are to recognize that they can contribute to the resolution of RtoP violations, and identify that it is an appropriate activity for them to take, an active attempt to engage business may be an important facilitator of this role.

This review of the literature suggests that there are several pathways by which business can be involved in the international movement to support RtoP, but also illustrates that these pathways are diverse and heavily contingent on the specific context where the company is interested in operating. For that reason, unlocking the potential benefit of the private sector will require a systematic outreach effort by entities interested in supporting RtoP. Without some kind of formal outreach and support from IGOs and NGOs interested in supporting RtoP, it's likely that the efforts of private sector actors will be uncoordinated and unsuccessful.

The challenges discussed above suggest that in order to encourage the positive participation of business in RtoP issues, entities interested in supporting business participation need to identify specific and reasonable activities that businesses can take, and tie these activities directly to economic and legal incentives for participation. More formal bridges between the business community and the "business and peace" community and the IGO and NGO discussion about RtoP could facilitate the development of these specific activities, and may also help to "widen the aperture" of potential actions and actors that are considered as relevant in discussions about RtoP.

## **Conclusion**

My primary purpose in this paper has been to attempt to bridge two discussions that both themselves straddle academic and policy worlds: the ongoing discussion about business engagement in conflict, and the developing discourse around the Responsibility to Protect. To date, both discussions have happened almost purely in isolation of each other, but both have important contributions that could be made to the other. From the business and peace side, the Responsibility to Protect discussion has developed both theoretical framings of what constitutes legitimate activity in conflict areas as well as a strong institutional framework to operationalize interventions to support stability. This can address business concerns about how to promote stability and what their appropriate role in this mix could be. From the RtoP side, the business and peace literature has developed a systematic approach to understanding why businesses should be interested

in promoting peace, and specifically what they may be able to do. A more systematic integration of these two ongoing discussions may help to address challenges faced by businesses working in areas where RtoP violations are immanent or ongoing, and also help broaden the toolkit currently considered by the institutions focused on RtoP. While such integration will likely uncover specific challenges not currently considered, it may also represent a significant step forward in the operationalization and implementation of business as a pro-social entity and the development of RtoP as a global norm.

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